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Editors’ Note 
 
The articles in this special issue have been developed from papers 
presented at the 2005 Highlands Institute for American Religious and 
Philosophical Thought Conference on Science and Religion, in 
Highlands, North Carolina.  The conference, chaired by Robert Neville, 
featured three plenary speakers well-known to the science and religion 
dialogue—Nancy Howell, Wentzel van Huyssteen, and Wesley 
Wildman.  Thirty other scholars presented original research on a wide 
variety of topics, including evolutionary theory, religion and science in 
naturalistic, panentheistic, and postmodern theologies, teaching religion 
and science, and the interplay of these two disciplines in the works of 
individual authors.  We regret that it was not possible to publish more 
of these exceptional papers. 

 
Comparative Natural Theology 
 
Wesley J. Wildman / Boston University 
 
Introduction 
 
his paper argues that there can be traction between an ontology of 
nature,1 on the one hand, and a metaphysics of ultimacy,2 on the 
other. This is contrary to traditional natural theology, which aims at 
direct entailment from an ontology of nature to a theory of ultimacy.3 It 
T 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper, “ontology of nature” could be called “philosophical 
cosmology”; in both cases the point is to establish basic categories for understanding all 
of nature and its operations. I use the former phrase here to avoid confusing 
“philosophical cosmology” with “scientific or physical cosmology.” Moreover, 
“ontology” focuses on the character of what exists, which is hospitable to natural 
theology’s inquiry into the ontological character of ultimacy. 
2 I use “ultimacy” rather than “ultimate reality” or “God” in deference to the results of 
the Comparative Religious Ideas Project. See Robert Cummings Neville, ed., The 
Human Condition (vol. 1), Ultimate Realities (vol. 2), and Religious Truth (vol. 3) 
(Albany, NY: SUNY, 2001). That project sought to identify through a rigorous process 
of comparison and analysis which categories work best to describe what is important 
about the ideas of world religious traditions, minimizing distortion and arbitrariness. 
One of the conclusions of the project, though for practical reasons not reflected in the 
title of the second volume, is that the term “ultimate realities,” while more generous and 
more useful than the singular term “ultimate reality” and the much used term “God,” is 
nevertheless biased against religious traditions that focus on the discovery and living 
out of ultimate ways or paths and on freeing people from an unhealthy obsession with 
ultimate realities. A vaguer category encompassing both “ultimate realities” and 
“ultimate paths” is preferable—thus “ultimacy.” My interest here is in metaphysical 
theories of ultimacy, of course, and this leans heavily toward “ultimate realities,” and 
yet I will persist in using the term “ultimacy” as a reminder of the complex diversity of 
religious thought in this area. The abstract retains “ultimate reality” for the sake of 
broader understanding. Elsewhere, I use “ultimate realities” rarely, and always as a 
specification of “ultimacy” that self-consciously subordinates “ultimate ways.” 
3 Natural theology is the subject of many definitions. For the sake of this essay, I take it 
to be the rational attempt to derive information about ultimacy (God, in some traditions) 
from philosophical interpretations of nature. Several comments are in order here. First, 
treating philosophical interpretations of nature as the starting point for inference serves 
to frame natural theology as an act of interpretation and thereby rejects the possibility 
that inference can ever be simply “from nature.” Even most scientific theorizing about 
nature is too constrained to be the basis for natural-theology inference; philosophical 
mediation is necessary for inquiry at the junction of nature and ultimacy metaphysics to 
be theologically significant. Second, some definitions of natural theology contrast it 
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is also contrary to detractors of natural theology who assert that no 
rational knowledge of ultimacy is possible based on any amount of 
analysis of the natural world. Traction between ontology of nature and 
ultimacy metaphysics is thus neither extremely strong nor entirely 
absent, but rather such as to have the limited effect of making some 
views of ultimacy less plausible and others more plausible. 
There are four reasons for judging the argumentative force of 
natural theological arguments in this way. First, there are many 
uncertainties about any ontology of nature. They are complex 
intellectual creations in their own right, dependent on synthesizing a 
great deal of scientific theorizing about nature and discovering 
principles by which to make sense of such rational structures of nature 
as exist. This is made difficult by the sheer enormity of the task but also 
by the fact that the natural sciences constitute a kind of uneven and 
sometimes ad hoc patchwork of theories about nature rather than a 
seamless garment of rational comprehensiveness. 
Second, there are always questions about the completeness of 
the set of ultimacy hypotheses that might have a claim in any natural 
theology argument. While we can run a natural theology argument 
through its paces and notice how some ultimacy theories fare better 
than others in the process, we are never certain that another ultimacy 
                                                                                                           
with revealed theology. This works in theological traditions for which informative 
revelation is possible and the distinction of revelation from natural processes is 
plausible. Some theological traditions reject one of these conditions. I reject both. I 
think information of any kind is unintelligible apart from nature and also that all 
knowledge is revealed as well as natural. I cannot elaborate this “ground of being” 
understanding of revelation here but its very possibility calls into question the 
advisability of defining natural theology by means of a contrast with revealed theology. 
Third, some have included in the domain of natural theology rational arguments for the 
existence of God that make no explicit reference whatsoever to nature. The basis for 
this appears to be that such arguments leverage the power of “natural reason” unaided 
by revelation, a usage indebted to the understanding (just discussed) of natural theology 
contrasted to revealed theology. In this context I take “natural” in “natural theology” to 
refer to the natural world and “natural reason” to be synonymous with “reason.” How 
does this definition of natural theology relate to, say, the ontological argument of Saint 
Anselm or Leibniz? It is mostly insignificant for natural theology, though not because it 
is impossible or because reason is in any sense not a part of nature but just because it 
lies outside the scope of reflection on the natural world. Of course, in a minor way it 
remains significant for natural theology as a phenomenon of nature that needs to be 
explained. But as a logical argument it belongs not to natural theology but to 
metaphysics. 
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theory not currently in the mix of competing hypotheses may fare better 
still. 
Third, this kind of reasoning is relatively new as an explicit 
form of inquiry, which means that the comparative criteria by which we 
discriminate superior from inferior metaphysical proposals about 
ultimacy are under-explored. Thus, we must allow that a given 
argument in natural theology could become more (or less) persuasive 
with time as comparative metaphysics gradually stabilizes and 
comparative criteria are better understood. For example, exactly how 
important are the criteria that “an adequate ultimacy metaphysics 
should solve the problem of the one and the many” and “an adequate 
ultimacy metaphysics should uphold the co-primordiality of principles 
of law and operations of chance in nature”? Is one of them more 
important than the other? Are they even fully compatible? 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, ultimacy may be such 
that there just is not one superior metaphysical theory of it. Rather, it 
may be replete with category-defying cognitive richness that forces 
perspectival scattering of metaphysical theories. Or it may surpass 
human rational capacities altogether. 
These difficulties do not constitute a knock-down argument 
against the possibility of natural theology. They define the senses in 
which natural theology is difficult and indicate the sorts of 
considerations that must be taken into account along the way. The claim 
of its possibility has to be established or refuted through attempts to do 
it. The chances of success turn decisively on how effectively 
philosophical interpretations of nature constrain theories of ultimacy. 
 
A Perennial Question 
C 
 
an nature tell us anything about ultimacy? This is an ancient 
question, shared across cultures, and handled differently but in 
structurally similar ways in West Asian, South Asian, and East Asian 
philosophical traditions. More often than not, the answer has been a 
qualified yes: the world around us does tell us something about 
ultimacy, but not as much as we might want to know. For example, the 
cosmological arguments of medieval Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
concurred that there must be an ultimate reality that gives rise to the 
proximate reality we know, but we cannot infer much about its 
character—certainly not as much as the sacred texts of these theistic 
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religions affirm. Similarly, many traditions of South Asian philosophy 
found it necessary to include authority as a valid form of inference 
(pramana) because observation and logic alone could not yield the 
Vedas’ portrayal of ultimacy. Chinese traditions perhaps have been the 
most optimistic about reading the character of ultimacy off of the way 
reality shows up for us in natural processes, but the plural and vague 
visions of ultimacy that typically result confirm the difficulty of the 
task. 
Within this mixed story about the inferential journey from 
nature to ultimacy there are specialized subplots, some highly skeptical 
and others extremely optimistic. On the skeptical side, Buddhist 
philosophy relies heavily on the possibility of inference from human 
experience to religious insight, but the fruit of this inference in the most 
rigorously philosophical forms of Buddhism (such as the Madhyamaka 
School of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy) is primarily a spiritually 
liberating path and only secondarily and vaguely a metaphysical 
portrayal of ultimacy. According to this way of thinking, reality as we 
conventionally experience it is deeply misleading. Careful inference 
from the suffering and contradictions of experience frees us from its 
delusions, including the twin delusions that there is an ultimate reality 
lying behind it all, and that we need to explain conventional reality with 
reference to some ontologically more basic theory of ultimate reality. 
Theistic traditions have produced another form of skepticism in 
the form of exclusive reliance on God’s self-revelation conjoined with 
the denial that we can infer anything about God from created reality. 
The utter transcendence of God motivates this skepticism (in twentieth-
century Swiss Christian theologian Karl Barth’s rejection of natural 
theology, for example), but the counterintuitive result is that there are 
no natural or scientific constraints whatsoever on revealed traditions’ 
claims about God. Could the loving God Barth believed in really create 
a world that was utterly misleading as a source of knowledge of God’s 
character? 
The extremely optimistic side is rare by comparison. Some 
thinkers have claimed that the pattern of inference from apparent design 
in cosmology and biology to a designer can produce detailed 
knowledge of the character and purposes of ultimacy as well as 
knowledge of its existence and its basic relation to the world. These 
natural theology enthusiasts sometimes even reject revealed theology 
altogether as too burdened with myth to make a useful contribution to 
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knowledge of ultimacy. Twentieth-century American philosopher 
Charles Hartshorne is an example of one type; early nineteenth-century 
German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel is an example of another; and 
Enlightenment Deism, a movement that continues down to the present 
in transformed ways and under different names, yet another. 
In our time, the well populated middle ground is the domain of 
discussion among most who are interested in science-religion relations. 
Most accept that nature constrains what we can say about ultimacy. 
They do this while admitting that nature does not permit clear lines of 
entailment from science to detailed knowledge of ultimacy, while 
tolerating a persistent lack of clarity about what precisely are these 
constraints. Within these boundaries several debated questions mark out 
the interior territory, and I note two here. 
First, are the constraints from science on hypotheses about 
ultimacy strict enough to allow direct entailment relations from science 
to God? Controversial intelligent design theorists such as American 
biochemist Michael Behe4 and American mathematician-philosopher 
William Dembski5 say yes, though they admit (consistently with the 
medieval design arguments) that the entailment does not yield much 
more than the sheer existence of a designer.6 Atheists say yes, too, and 
it is the non-existence of a divine being that science entails, but this is a 
                                                 
4 Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New 
York: Free Press, 1996). See also Behe, William A. Dembski, and Stephen C. Meyer, 
Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe: Papers Presented as a Conference 
Sponsored by the Wethersfield Institute, New York City, September 25, 1999 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000). 
5 William A. Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small 
Probabilities (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and No 
Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
6 Technically speaking, the designer may be clever aliens rather than any deity. This 
curious possibility even has a literary history. One of the premier examples is Douglas 
Adams’s Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, a 1978 BBC radio comedy subsequently 
transformed into a series of novels (first published in 1988) and two movies (the last of 
which was released in 2005). The premise includes an Earth designed and created by 
the alien Slartibartfast and his Magrathean colleagues on a contract with a race of 
hyper-intelligent, pan-dimensional beings who want to use the Earth as a giant 
supercomputer to find the ultimate answer to the question of life, the universe, and 
everything. But this kind of scenario leads to a vicious regress: whence Slartibartfast? 
Intelligent design theorists know full well that the resulting regress requires the 
postulate of a supernatural designer, which makes their entertaining the possibility of 
aliens as designers even more curious. 
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relatively rare view. Numerous contemporary skeptical authors from 
American astronomer Carl Sagan7 to Skeptics Society founder Michael 
Shermer8 stop just short of evidence-based atheism when they say that 
science is steadily removing any need we once might have had to 
postulate God. Most in the science-religion dialogue suspect that 
science is too vague to determine a single view of ultimacy and that the 
best we can aim for is consonance relations between scientific and 
traditional religion-based theological understandings of the world.9 
Some, such as American metaphysician Robert Neville, deliberately 
aim for metaphysical formulations of ultimacy that are perfectly neutral 
to scientific theories. He reasons that if there were any inferential 
traction between the cosmological pictures of science and the 
metaphysical pictures of ultimacy, then the latter would be too coarsely 
formulated, too much in thrall to the actual cosmology of our universe 
and insufficiently attuned to the ontological conditions for any possible 
cosmological environment. 
Second, can science help us choose among competing views of 
ultimacy, even if it does not select out a uniquely adequate view? This 
question is under-explored because most people involved in science-
religion discussions have not engaged religions beyond their own, or 
conflicting views within their own religion, well enough to make 
serious comparative analysis feasible. It is an emerging issue, however, 
and thinking about it carefully leads to a clarified understanding of what 
has really been going on in traditional natural theology all along, but 
hidden in unanalyzed premises. 
 
The New Natural Theology 
 
f science constrains hypotheses about ultimacy at all, it does so by 
means of mediating disciplines that help bridge the often noted gap 
                                                
I 
 
7 Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World (New York: Random House, 1996). 
8 Michael Shermer, Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, 
and Other Confusions of Our Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Owl 
Books, 2002). 
9 Nancey Murphy provides a compact survey of types of logical connection between 
science and religion in “Postmodern Apologetics, or Why Theologians Must Pay 
Attention to Science,” in W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman, eds., Religion 
and Science: History, Method, Dialogue (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 
105-20. The volume situates this essay as part of a larger debate on the topic of holistic 
justification versus stronger entailment relations between science and theology. 
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between the conceptuality of science and the conceptuality of religious 
thought. Ethics (rigorous discussion of moral values) and ontology 
(rigorous discussion of being and existence) are the most common 
mediating disciplines. The latter is the domain of natural theology, as 
well as other philosophical pastimes such as varieties of existential and 
phenomenological analysis. According to this parsing of the 
possibilities, natural theology presupposes the move from scientific 
theories of nature to philosophical interpretations of nature that disclose 
the ontological structures and processes that suffuse all of nature. It is at 
this point that natural theology proper takes over. Natural theology 
attempts to take the step from ontology of nature to a metaphysical 
theory of ultimacy. 
Regarding the first move, from nature to ontology of nature, 
there is a great deal in contemporary science that has implications for 
ontology of nature. For example, the ontology resulting from scientific 
theories of the law-like and chance-like behavior of the natural world 
can become a suggestive starting point for the second step, natural 
theology proper. In this case, natural theology would seek to discover 
whether an ontology of nature stressing the entanglement of law-like 
and chance-like processes in nature can support traction with theories of 
ultimacy. There are many other examples of the first step from theories 
of science to ontologies of nature, some focusing on quantum 
entanglement, some on natural law, some on emergence and 
complexity. 
Unsurprisingly, this first step has its detractors, but it is 
particularly important to admit openly that the second step, natural 
theology proper, is utterly indigestible to a fairly large group of 
impressive intellectuals who ought to be in a position to know what 
human inquiry can and cannot accomplish. For them, constructing an 
ultimacy metaphysics on the basis of an ontology of nature or in any 
other way is just a waste of time and finally deeply misleading. Perhaps 
it would be advisable here to take for granted the value of ultimacy 
metaphysics, just to avoid the complexities involved in entertaining 
alternative viewpoints. But whether and how to proceed beyond 
ontologies of nature of the basic sort I defend here is a pressing 
question in our time, and the competing approaches are accompanied by 
potent sensibilities about the morality of inquiry. This produces 
misunderstanding and confusion often enough that an argument on 
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behalf of one’s own approach in relation to sympathetic portrayals of 
alternatives could be helpful, if it is not absolutely required. 
I make out three fundamentally distinct approaches to the 
question of whether and how to move beyond ontologies of nature to 
metaphysics of ultimacy. Each has a kind of appeal, which explains the 
passion with which it is held, and also the prevalence of 
misunderstanding across the differences. 
Approach 1: We should stop at ontology of nature, which is 
already extremely adventurous. Further speculation about ultimacy 
should remain personal and private, or perhaps shared among close 
friends, but not framed as material for meaningful public discussion. 
We might consider going so far as to demythologize the non-empirical 
content of speculative ontologies, reframing “laws of nature” as 
observable regularities in reality and “operations of chance” as 
ungrounded randomness, but we must stay silent about ultimate “why” 
questions. This is the sort of modesty demanded by our repeated 
experience of not being able to settle more aggressive metaphysical 
inquiries. It requires us to rein in our desires for comprehensive 
explanations of all reality but this can be a relief as much as a 
disappointment once we appreciate how politically and morally 
dangerous comprehensive meta-narratives have proved in all human 
civilizations. 
Evaluation: The difficulty here is the arbitrariness of not 
asking a good question, even if the question is an extremely difficult 
one to answer in fully satisfying ways. This has a subtle relation to the 
problem of oppressive meta-narratives: one of the most effective ways 
of attacking oppressive metaphysical stories is to take a systematic 
approach, which helps us notice what they leave out or distort. This is 
an option that this first approach forgoes. In other words, the appealing 
modesty of refusing systematic metaphysics can also leave us 
vulnerable to unscrupulous story tellers and their subtly or overtly 
oppressive meta-narratives. 
Approach 2: Some (philosophical theologians of a sort) 
inquire into ultimacy using ontology of nature as the key to refining 
theological hypotheses. This is natural theology but carried out in a 
potentially cross-traditional way (e.g., Philip Clayton, Niels Gregersen, 
Alfred North Whitehead, in various ways, to various degrees). 
Evaluation: The challenge here is the size of the task when we 
make our ontological speculations vulnerable to criticism from so many 
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scholarly disciplines, and multiple philosophical traditions and religious 
perspectives. It is arguably an absurdly impractical project. 
Approach 3: Some (confessional theologians of a sort) use an 
ontology of nature as a framework for articulating one tradition’s 
existing beliefs about ultimacy in a plausible and faith-nurturing way 
(e.g., Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert 
John Russell). This approach involves reducing the complexity of 
metaphysical inquiry by shifting the goal from inferring a theory of 
ultimacy as the best explanation for the world around us to merely 
showing the credibility of existing beliefs using a plausible ontology. 
Evaluation: Focusing on one tradition is appealingly modest, 
practical in its recognition of our inability to know everything, and easy 
to motivate because of the practical relevance of this sort of inquiry to 
particular religious communities. But it seems arbitrary and self-serving 
to neglect parallel and possibly contradictory wisdom in other religious 
traditions. This is tolerable when working within a particular religion, 
perhaps, but even there questions about the ever-present “other” are 
always close at hand, more so in our time than ever. 
I think that each of these three approaches is feasible for 
particular purposes and groups. Even the first, highly cautious approach 
can be the basis for a rich spiritual appreciation of nature and ultimacy, 
albeit expressed indirectly through cultivating reverence for nature or 
through poetic and artistic media (e.g., Sufi stories or Zen haiku or 
Romantic nature poetry). Certainly the third approach has much to 
commend it in particular communities, where the aspirations of 
rationality are not comprehensive but rather limited by that 
community’s immediate needs. I appreciate the first and third 
approaches and yet want to insist that the second approach is also 
valuable, against criticisms of immodesty and impracticality from the 
other two approaches. It is possible in principle to use comparative 
philosophical theology to force contact between competing 
metaphysical theories of ultimacy, even if the task in practice is 
complicated by the difficulty of working across languages, eras, and 
cultures, and by the familiar specter of metaphysical arbitrariness. We 
can only secure this possibility by successful attacks on the arguments 
against it, such as those of Kant and Logical Positivism, but I must take 
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this success for granted in this context.10 On the practicality issue, I 
contend that comparative metaphysics is gradually becoming a more 
feasible form of inquiry as the field of religious studies expands and our 
understanding of world philosophies becomes richer and more detailed. 
I am certainly not alone in my affection for the second 
approach. Many theists and religious naturalists have been strongly 
attracted to the move from ontologies of nature to an adjudication of 
theories of ultimacy. Unfortunately, historic attempts to establish direct 
entailment from ontology of nature to ultimacy metaphysics—I am 
calling this traditional natural theology—have been very weak on the 
comparative front. This has a serious consequence. If natural theology 
is about entailment relations from nature to God, then the broadly 
accepted foundering of design or other cosmological arguments for 
God’s existence can provoke abandonment of natural theology 
altogether. I consider this abandonment, which is fairly widespread in 
our time, premature. What is required is not the abandonment of, or 
obstinate clinging to, discredited arguments in natural theology but a 
correction to the understanding of natural theology itself. 
 
Contrasting Traditional and Comparative Natural Theology 
 
omparative natural theology, properly understood, is not about 
entailment relations from nature to a preferred metaphysics of 
ultimacy. Rather it seeks to compare numerous compelling accounts of 
ultimacy in as many different respects as are relevant. In this 
comparison-based way, we assemble the raw materials for inference-to-
best-explanation arguments on behalf of particular theories of ultimacy, 
and we make completely clear the criteria for preferring one view of 
ultimacy to another. Schematizing this in a basic way can help to clarify 
the difference between traditional natural theology and the new natural 
theology. 
C 
An ontology of nature, O, is enormously complex, logically. At 
the simplest and most idealized level, O is a finite conjunction of (say, 
n) propositions, O1^O2^O3^…^On. But the complexity arises when we 
allow for the facts that (1) these propositions collectively may not be 
mutually consistent, (2) the conjunction in any given formulation does 
                                                 
10 There are many sound refutations of skeptical arguments against metaphysics. One of 
the most compelling is Robert Cummings Neville, The Highroad around Modernism 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 
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not exhaust everything relevant to an ontology of nature, (3) the 
collection of propositions is a snapshot of a dynamic process whereby 
the ontology constantly adjusts to the growing insight of those who 
articulate it and to changes in scientific theories, (4) some of the 
propositions are more robust than others because they are most closely 
tied to well attested scientific theories, and (5) scientific theories 
themselves are snapshots of dynamic research programs with complex 
internal structures and relations to data. This realistic picture of the 
internal structure of an ontology of nature is utterly neglected in 
traditional natural theology. 
Working from the most superficial characterization of an 
ontology of nature as a finite conjunction of consistent propositions, 
traditional natural theology tries to establish entailment from 
propositions in O to propositions about ultimacy, say, 
 
U1=“A First Cause exists and we call it God,” and 
U2=“An Intelligent Designer exists and we call it God.” 
 
That is, traditional natural theology seeks arguments that, say, O3→U1 
or O14→U2. Because of the hidden but false assumption of the static 
perfection and internal consistency of O, this amounts to O→U1 and 
O→U2. Moreover, despite the fact that the history of theology displays 
real problems establishing the consistency of all propositions about 
ultimacy that are pronounced therein, traditional natural theology 
stipulates the desired consistency, which results in the appealing but 
manifestly over-simplified conclusion that O→U. Voila! God exists and 
we even know something about the divine nature, all on the basis of 
analyzing implications of our observations about nature. No wonder 
there has been so much hostility to traditional natural theology. 
Comparative natural theology is painfully sensitive to all of the 
fallacies in the argumentative procedure of traditional natural theology. 
I think that satisfactorily correcting these fallacies requires what I call 
the hypothetico-corrective theory of inquiry, but there is no space for a 
full account of that theory of inquiry here.11 The following 
                                                 
11  A serviceable summary is Wesley J. Wildman, “The Resilience of Religion in 
Secular Social Environments: A Pragmatic Analysis,” in Michael G. Parker and 
Thomas M. Schmidt, eds., Scientific Explanation and Religious Belief: Science and 
Religion in Philosophical and Public Discourse (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2005): 58-
80. 
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schematization, however, does give an indication of some of the logical 
steps involved. Suppose we have three hypotheses about ultimacy, UH1, 
UH2, and UH3 (these might be, for example, “Ultimacy is a personal 
supernatural being with intentions, plans, and powers to act”; “Reality 
is self-caused and ontologically ungrounded”; and “Ultimacy is Being 
Itself”). The examples illustrate how complex an ultimacy hypothesis 
can be but, for the sake of exposition, let us neglect such details and 
concentrate on the relation of these ultimacy hypotheses to the 
ontological theory of nature, O, which is supposed to help us decide 
among these ultimacy hypotheses. Specifically, and remembering the 
complexity and possible internal inconsistency of O, suppose that 
 
UH1→{O1,O6,O8,O11}, 
UH2→{O1,O5,O6}, and 
UH3→{O1,O2,O4,O8}. 
 
It follows from this that the ontological proposition O1 is of little use in 
detecting superiority of one ultimacy hypothesis over the other two, 
because all three entail it. Other ontological propositions would be more 
useful but comparative criteria (CC) are required to realize this 
potential. Consider the following examples: 
 
CC1: “O6 is especially important,” and 
CC2: “O8 is especially important.” 
 
In practice, comparative criteria are often much more complex than this, 
involving several features of an ontology simultaneously, with intricate 
interpretative dimensions. But even in these simplified cases, we can 
conclude that: 
 
CC1 (“O6 is important”)→UH1 and UH2 are superior to UH3; 
CC2 (“O8 is important”)→UH1 and UH3 are superior to UH2. 
 
Subsequent debates over the relative weighting of comparative criteria 
CC1 and CC2 determine which of UH1, UH2, and UH3 is finally the best 
explanation of the ontology of nature, O. In this instance, UH3 is not 
faring well, while a decision between UH1 and UH2 would depend on 
which comparative criterion, CC1 or CC2, gets heavier weighting. 
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The confidence with which we draw a final conclusion from an 
inference-to-best-explanation style of argument of this sort depends 
upon how sure we are that (1) we have all of the relevant ultimacy 
hypotheses in play, (2) we have recognized all of the relevant 
comparative criteria, (3) we have properly accommodated our reasoning 
to the complexity of the ontology of nature and of the scientific theories 
on which it depends, and (4) we are realistic about the distinctiveness of 
any arguments concerning ultimacy. Traditional natural theology 
flagrantly violates all of these criteria for soundness of reasoning: (1) it 
usually ignores alternative ultimacy hypotheses, (2) it neglects explicit 
comparative criteria, (3) it oversimplifies both ontological premises and 
the scientific theories that inform them, and (4) it often treats ultimacy 
arguments as strictly analogous to arguments in other domains. 
The transparency of criteria for metaphysical superiority 
(corresponding to comparative criteria) in the new natural theology is a 
huge advance on the covert operation of such criteria in traditional but 
wrong-headed forms of natural theology. It also stimulates superior 
conversation across different views because transparent criteria are 
vulnerable to criticism in a way that covert criteria are not. It is an open 
question whether an extended period of comparative metaphysics of 
this sort would induce greater agreement among those who initially 
value criteria for metaphysical adequacy differently. But there is no 
question that it would promote greater mutual understanding as well as 
more meaningful and satisfying debate. 
 
Inference to Best Explanation Revisited 
T 
 
his logical analysis of inference-to-best-explanation argumentation 
stands in tension with existing analyses within so-called 
confirmation theory, which rely on Bayesian probability. The standard 
Bayesian account of inference to best explanation depends on 
evaluating the probability of propositions given certain conditioning 
factors. The relevant formalism is as follows: let P(A|BC) stand for the 
probability of proposition A given propositions B and C. Suppose that 
H is an hypothesis intended to explain evidence E in the context of 
background facts F. How “good” is H as an hypothesis? To begin with, 
neglecting the evidence E, H might be absurd relative to background 
facts F, so we need to keep an eye on the prior probability of H, which 
is P(H|F). Prior probability is high when H is simple or elegant or 
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possesses other desirable intrinsic features, and also when H fits closely 
with F. Next, we also need a way to measure the explanatory power of 
H, which is P(H|EF). Explanatory power is high when H has high 
predictive power; that is, P(E|HF) is high, meaning that E is likely on 
the assumption of the hypothesis H and given background facts F. 
Explanatory power is high also when E has low prior probability; that 
is, P(E|F) is low, meaning that evidence E is unlikely to occur just given 
background facts F and disregarding the hypothesis H. Finally, in cases 
where two hypotheses, H1 and H2, have equal explanatory power, i.e., 
P(H1|EF)=P(H2|EF), the hypothesis with the higher prior probability 
wins; that is, H1 wins when P(H1|F)>P(H2|F). 
Bayesian accounts typically neglect the role of comparative 
adjudication or rest content with simple pair-wise comparison of 
competing hypotheses. They also assume the meaningfulness of the 
“prior probability” of any hypothesis, which is its likelihood of being 
true given background information but disregarding the specific 
evidence pertaining to the situation in which the question about the 
hypothesis actually arises. This involves using unanalyzed concepts of 
simplicity, elegance, and fit with existing knowledge—the factors 
involved in judging prior probability. In the case of metaphysical 
hypotheses, and indeed hypotheses of most kinds, prior probability is a 
grossly abstracted concept. Even in the classic examples of hypothetical 
explanations of a crime scene, the idea of prior probability of an 
hypothesis seems no more than a hand-waving gesture toward actual 
probability calculations, and thus probability talk functions more as a 
guiding analogy to keep one’s head clear, or an after-the-fact 
rationalization of vastly complex intuitive judgments. 
The fact that many philosophers remain deeply dissatisfied with 
the Bayesian account of inference to best explanation12 has not 
prevented some philosophical theologians from making hearty use of 
this Bayesian way of formalizing inference to best explanation in their 
arguments for the existence of God.13 More pertinently, the philosophy 
                                                 
12 For a colorful review of the advantages and disadvantages of Bayesian probability in 
confirmation theory, see John Earman, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of 
Bayesian Confirmation Theory (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1992). 
13 A classic example is Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979). He uses the basics of confirmation theory, limiting himself to judgments 
of “more likely” and “most likely” rather than attempting to assign numbers for 
probabilities. But he does not investigate the virtues of alternative hypotheses despite 
pointing out that it is important to allow for this (cf. 19), and he does not address in any 
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of science has demonstrated that the logic of confirmation is formidably 
complex in actual practice, certainly not reducible to the terms of 
Bayesian probability, and possibly not even fully rational at key 
decision points.14 This leaves these theological adventures in 
confirmation theory looking both innocent and bizarrely abstract. 
Recent philosophical attempts to refine (or to produce!) 
understanding of judgments of similarity and difference, of consonance 
and dissonance, of elegance and coherence, have turned especially on 
the integration of cognitive science and philosophy. Cognitive modeling 
has proved to be an important tool here, and not for nothing: such 
judgments occur in prodigiously complex brains that may have special 
ways of detecting overall resonance between two sets of biologically 
coded information.15 These consonance-detection methods may be 
irreducible to simple probability calculations or even logical arguments. 
Yet they may still be logically pertinent if these biologically-based 
mechanisms for assessing resonance produce useful results not merely 
accidentally but on the basis of neural functions refined through 
evolutionary pressures. We might abstract from such processes a 
Bayesian framework for understanding them but, inevitably, such 
abstractions will not prove very illuminating. 
Human beings may have natural consonance-detection abilities, 
but we are also vulnerable to serious errors of judgment. Our pattern-
                                                                                                           
sustained way the difficulties facing attempts to determine the prior probability of a 
metaphysical hypothesis about ultimate reality. Also see Swinburne’s An Introduction 
to Confirmation Theory (London: Methuen & Co., 1973). 
14 This reflects the debate between Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend over the 
rationality of decisions to abandon apparently degenerating research programs. See 
Matteo Motterlini, ed., For and Against Method: Including Lakatos’ Lectures on 
Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1999). The key background works are Imre Lakatos, The 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, John Worrall and Gregory Currie, eds. 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970); and Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 3rd ed. 
(London and New York: Verso, 1993). 
15 Connectionalist models of brain processes are especially useful here because they can 
represent hypotheses as distributed activation patterns of nodes in a connectionist 
machine. This in turn allows consonance and dissonance to be represented as pattern 
similarity and overlap. Judgments of similarity are then akin to pattern recognition 
skills. For example, see Paul Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989) and Paul Thagard, Conceptual Revolutions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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recognition skills appear to be over-productive of hypotheses to explain 
the puzzles we come across. This is useful when we are searching for 
explanations, and thus highly relevant to evolutionary survival, which 
probably explains how we got this way. But it can also dangerously 
mislead us into trusting “feelings” of similarity where in fact this leads 
to mistakes—sometimes deadly ones.16 In the context of comparative 
metaphysics and religion, especially, this propensity to trust feelings of 
consonance must be handled with extreme care. It takes decades of 
training both to help people make use of their abilities for inquiry and to 
train them to overcome their liabilities as inquirers. Even with such 
protracted training, experts still make errors of reasoning, particularly 
around questions of similarity and dissimilarity. Such errors in 
comparative religion have been traced with aggressive precision.17 The 
result is that that a new collaborative approach has seemed necessary if 
we are to compare religious ideas with any degree of confidence.18
In light of these complexities, and without even touching on the 
distinctive considerations of ultimacy metaphysics, it is obvious that a 
Bayesian analysis of inference to best explanation is seriously deficient. 
The alternative analysis I have proposed stresses awareness of many 
relevant hypotheses, transparency of the comparative criteria that guide 
judgments of similarity and difference, and the dynamic complexity of 
both ontologies of nature and ultimacy theories. This approach still does 
not come to terms with the way we make judgments of similarity and 
difference, of simplicity and fit. But it has been made responsive to the 
problem by building in the kind of transparency and flexibility that 
                                                 
16 There are many compendiums of errors due to biological limitations on human 
rationality, including examples of the ways that unscrupulous people exploit such 
vulnerabilities for their own profit and amusement. See, for example, Thomas Gilovich, 
How We Know What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Reason in Everyday Life (Free Press, 
1993); Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule 
Our Minds (John Wiley and Sons, 1996); Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and 
Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); James Randi, Flim Flam: Psychics, 
ESP, Unicorns and other Delusions (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1982); Carl 
Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (New York: 
Random House, 1996); Michael Shermer, Why People Believe Weird Things: 
Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time (New York: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1997). 
17 See, for example, Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” in Imagining 
Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
18 This was the aim of the Comparative Religious Ideas Project; see fn 2. 
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facilitates correction of judgments in an ongoing process of adjustment 
and improvement. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 have argued that natural theology, properly understood, is possible in 
principle. I have also argued that its prospects are uncertain. It 
depends on a complex kind of comparative argumentation whose 
logical structure I have laid out even while acknowledging that many 
aspects of the judgments involved—especially those of consonance and 
dissonance, similarity and difference—remain problematic. 
I 
It is important in concluding to recognize that natural theology 
is only one aspect of theological reflection. Theology takes shape in 
traditions, with support from religious or secular scholarly institutions. 
When theology attempts to address metaphysical questions—a move 
whose current unpopularity I take to be a seasonal phenomenon—it is 
no less dependent on such traditions and institutions for the reception 
and carrying forward of its plausibility conditions and canons of 
rationality. The results of natural theology (in the comparative sense) 
can play an important role in structuring and adjusting these plausibility 
conditions and canons of rationality, thereby helping to guide 
metaphysical reflection on theological topics. Yet even with input from 
natural theology, it remains possible to defend within a robust social 
context and lively intellectual tradition almost any metaphysical theory 
of ultimacy. Such is the wealth of considerations that are relevant to 
judging the adequacy of any ultimacy metaphysics. 
This non-decisive rational landscape is the inevitable character 
of metaphysics outside the domain of natural theology. We theologians 
can choose to learn from the constraints of natural theology, on pain of 
having to fight with the natural sciences—a possible but unappetizing 
battle. After that we build ingenious theories around ultimacy 
hypotheses that artfully balance criteria in a way that honors the 
struggles and strange currents of our own lives and the traditions that 
form us. It is a partly rational process, but also partly incomprehensible, 
the product of unfathomable drives and intriguing instincts and 
untraceable influences. 
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Metaphysics is not completely arbitrary, solely a matter of taste 
and tradition; natural theology properly understood shows that this 
pessimistic view is mistaken. But we also need to resist the fantasy that 
ultimacy metaphysics is exhaustively rational in the sense that every 
question can be decided. Correspondingly, we should heartily embrace 
the inchoate forces that dispose us to prefer one hypothesis over 
another, one aesthetic sensibility to another, one way of balancing 
criteria rather than another. 
Surely it would be easier to embrace our personal involvement 
in metaphysical theory building if we knew that the Kantian and 
logical-positivist detractors, the Heideggerian anti-onto-theological and 
postmodern anti-logocentric accusers of metaphysics were at least 
partly mistaken. After all, none of us wants to be the poster child for 
deluded metaphysical speculation. But perhaps this is precisely what 
comparative natural theology offers: by eschewing rational 
overreaching, and by cautiously accepting the complexities of 
multidisciplinary crosscultural comparative inquiry, natural theology 
actually produces credible results that meaningfully constrain ultimacy 
metaphysics. It is not the grand achievement of now discredited 
traditional natural theology, to be sure, but that turns out to be a great 
advantage. Modest achievements build confidence precisely because 
they do not overreach and do not underestimate difficulties. 
Comparative natural theology creates confidence to venture speculative 
arguments about ultimacy and nurtures willingness to accept our 
emotional and spiritual entanglement in metaphysical theory building. 
